At first glance, the higher education sector may look to have embraced the challenges and pressures of moving towards a market system. However, there remain longer term issues that must be addressed if the higher education sector is to survive and ultimately prosper. This paper examines more closely the financial and legislative reforms implemented in the Russian Higher Education sector. It outlines the institutional and structural changes that have taken place in response to these changes, and the effect of the external environment on the sector. The implications for further reform and institutional change are also discussed. These issues are analysed within a framework of the New-Institutional approach to economic organisations.
Introduction
All economic agents in Russia, including business enterprises, public entities, government regulatory agencies and households, face significant challenges during the transition period.
The overall mission of these entities, demand structure for their services and products, as well as their overall external environment has changed dramatically. In order to secure their future, both businesses and public institutions need to develop and implement an adequate adjustment strategy that would reflect the new realities of operating within a market environment. One of the most dramatic challenges facing every organisation during the transition process is the need for major innovations in behaviour. However, there is still evidence of continued path dependence, particularly in the public sector, that may be attributed partly to the obsolete legislative base, and partly to historically inherited institutions reflecting the traditions of the past.
This current paper tries to identify the new patterns of economic and financial behaviour of economic agents, namely universities, operating in higher education in Russia. The primary emphasis is placed on the changes that take place at the individual institutional level of higher education within the overall legal, economic and financial framework that exists in the Russian higher education sector. Universities and Institutes of Higher Education (IHEs) are treated here as firms that provide educational services and research output to meet the specified demand. In doing this, IHEs 'charge' their customers for the services they produce in various ways. IHEs can be thought of as business firms and in order to secure certain levels of efficiency they may have an internal organisation that should match a set of institutional, legal and economic constraints.
The scope of change in the economic and financial environment for IHEs since 1992 has been dramatic. Within this, the Russian educational entities have responded to these changes in many different ways. Some of the trends described in this paper may be transition-specific and should be considered as temporary and thus subsequently be eliminated as soon as the overall economic and institutional setting is more settled. Some other adjustment trends will remain in place.
The presentation of material is organised to reflect the concepts of the modern neoinstitutional approach to economic analysis. This New-Institutional approach, brought to prominence by North, built on the concepts of Coase and Williamson amongst others. The latter two authors analyse the relationships between firms and their internal organisation, which provides us with a basis for the examination of economic performance. More specifically, North analysed the relationships between the inefficiency arising from institutional structures and institutional change in the capitalist society and its overall contribution to economic growth. The application of New-Institutional concepts to structural changes within the Russian higher education sector seems appropriate. These methods are very useful in interpreting the widespread developments of economic transition, especially at the micro level.
The paper is also based on the analysis of current legislation and the recent reform proposals for the education sector, more specifically the Russian Federation Law on Education (1992, later amended in 1996) and the Russian Law on Higher Professional Education (1996) . It reflects current thinking on higher education reform as reflected in the Russian press and personal experience of the authors at various levels of administration in higher education.
Higher Education as an Economic and Institutional System
For the purposes of current analysis we use the analogue of regarding the higher education sector as an industry. This approach permits us to consider separately the process of provision of educational services and the organisation of the providers of educational services (businesses). It also enables us to examine the composition of demand for education, the methods by which providers identify the needs for education and how the provision of educational services is paid for (the mechanisms of financing education) as well as to assess how capital is used by the providers of education. This approach allows us to identify specific structural aspects of change in the highly diversified and complex system of higher education while it undergoes major transformation.
This analytical approach requires that provision of educational services should be considered separately from the financing of education. Students (graduates) should be considered as the immediate consumers of educational services. However we should bear in mind that due to the low specification of education as a type of activity, many of the positive externalities of education are not captured solely by the individual, but dispersed through to the larger groups of beneficiaries namely businesses, communities or society as a whole. So, while students can be treated as the immediate customers of educational services, the actual beneficiaries of the education process are actually represented by a much broader group. Within this framework every existing model of higher education can be described by a number of specific features and a combination of the following factors:
(i) a set of historically evolved and currently prevailing social institutions and patterns of behaviour (common law principles) that lay out the basis for legislation and regulations (formal law) defining general institutional constraints and specific principles of performance and organisation for higher education;
(ii) the stock of educational assets; such as faculty and non-academic labour, tangible and non-tangible assets (university buildings and facilities, laboratory and class equipment, academic know-how, etc.) used by institutes of higher education in the provision of educational services; (iii) entities (firms) providing educational services; which include universities, colleges and other institutes of higher education organised in a specific way (collegially or hierarchically, publicly or privately-owned, organised as a set of departments or a combination of semi-autonomous colleges and schools) to secure a certain level of efficiency in provision of educational services; (iv) a certain amount of national income that is channelled in a specific way (through government budget allocations, private tuition or other methods) to 'buy' a certain amount of educational services from institutes of higher education and/or to replenish the capital stock of higher education institutions.
(v) a combination of political elites and interest groups within and outside of higher education that speak on behalf of higher education and the society and influence changes in (i) and (iv) in particular. These include governmental, administrative and professional groups and associations influencing the design of educational policies, resource inflow to the sector, governance of educational institutions and the administration of the educational process.
(vi) customers of educational services (students) driven into education by various incentives, changes in the labour market and public policies towards higher education.
There is a considerable degree of interdependence and consistency between these factors. For instance, the historical tradition of public provision and centralised governmental funding for higher education is likely to facilitate consolidation of interests in governmental agencies and management bureaucracies within higher education. This alliance is likely to support conservation of supply-driven financial schemes in higher education, non-transparent administrative allocation of funding for and within IHEs and administrative governance methods of individual universities. To the contrary, traditionally high private funding of higher education is usually associated with a more decentralised provision of educational services.
This implies a limited role for governmental administrative agencies, and an increased role of professional associations in quality assurance and market forces in defining the size of resource inflow into higher education and its structure. Development of a specific model for higher education finance, governance and organisation is usually strongly associated with the dominant institutional framework in society.
Recent history presents examples of a number of cases of systemic change in higher education. This involves major transformations to almost every element of the system, including core rules and principles, patterns of financial flows, universities' performance as well as other inter-relationships with the government. The trend in most industrialised countries is that governments tend to withdraw from direct administration of higher education and rely more on 'steering at a distance'. This involves setting the broad parameters for higher education development, while leaving most of the details and initiatives to individual institutions.
1 The most notable recent systemic changes are those experienced in the UK and the current transformation of higher education in the countries of transition.
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In the case of the UK the initial reform process was sector specific, and was enforced by a combination of economic and political factors. In particular the national policy-makers responded to strong public pressure and some interest groups from within the higher education sector (polytechnics in particular). The reform process was undertaken according to the core principles of maintaining accountability of higher education and enhancing the transparency of rules to stimulate increased competition within the academic profession. This process has led to a strengthening of the academic collegial control of the system. Recently the core element of the reforms centred on the issues of financing higher education.
The recent reform process in the UK included the formulation of the Universities Funding Council (UFC). At this time the Universities Funding Council (UFC) emphasises allocation of research grants on the basis of performance indicators, expansion of the principles of the block grant award by the UFC with respect to teaching, and the abolition of the binary divide between the universities and those institutes that were previously regarded as polytechnics.
The response to this legislation by institutions led to closer examination of management responsibilities and power, revision of issues of remuneration and payments to staff members as well as decentralisation along the lines of departments and/or faculties becoming 'cost or profit centres'. Although the reasons and purposes for the transition in Russia are dramatically different to those found in the UK, we have seen a context where internal governance arrangements (one aspect of Neo-Institutional economics) has come to be of concern to
IHEs. In this we have highlighted the requirements for the Russian higher education sector in the context of the present reforms, in line with the overall purpose of this paper.
In the countries in transition (Russia is an extreme case as an example), the education reforms were very much triggered by the overall political, economic and social transformation in society that constituted an external shock for education. The initial changes in higher education were permitted because of the overall democratisation of society. The significant decline in the availability of resources to the education sector as a whole, previously available through the traditional public channels of financing, made financing and governance reforms imperative. Reform of the economy also resulted in rapid structural changes in demand for educational services. IHEs have responded to this through adjustments in the content of education, significant cuts in non-wage items of their budgets and various financial innovations. The response of public universities to the new demand has been somewhat slow and the emerging niche in demands for education is beginning to be filled by nongovernmental institutions. 
The Institutional and Legal Framework of Russian Higher Education and the Evolving Organization of the Sector
The Russian system of higher education has a long-standing academic and educational tradition. The system is both comprehensive and diversified; significant intellectual capacity and academic know-how has accumulated in many areas of science, for example mathematics, chemistry, biology, engineering, philology, psychology to name a few. These represent visible returns to the investment in higher education under the traditional Soviet command-based economy, which is characterised by German-type research university organisations, and has over 500 Universities and other Institutes of Higher Education.
An Institutional framework for higher education in Russia
Higher education in Russia and the Soviet Union was traditionally government controlled and centrally managed. Evolution of the sector was part of the overall economic strategy of development to maintain East-West strategic balance during the Cold War period. Therefore the state paid significant attention to the development of higher education in order to secure the training of a cadre of scientists, engineers and managers needed to implement large scale industrial projects involved in areas of crucial importance for the development of defence capacity. These more specifically included mathematics, nuclear physics, computer science, chemistry, and various types of mechanical engineering.
Under the command administrative system the only way any sector of the national economy could be organised would be through the direct allocation of resources to state-managed producers of goods and services. This was achieved by a centrally-managed system of quotas, strict control over performance and state control over the use of the output throughout the planned system. In their application to Russian (Soviet) higher education, these principles transformed into the following organisational principles:
• All Universities (IHEs) were state managed through the federal level Ministry of Higher Education and/or sectoral ministries.
• The allocation of resources for IHEs, both for operating expenses as well as for development and expansion reflected, at least in theory, the expected future needs of the national economy for qualified personnel of specific type and the strategic priorities of the economy.
• The principles and procedures of Universities' performance were clearly specified and carefully designed, and a comprehensive monitoring and enforcement mechanism was in place to ensure that these were upheld.
• All university graduates were expected to be placed in positions at enterprises according to state planning quotas.
The mechanisms for quality control in academic institutions were organised as hierarchies and were based on securing an adequate amount of inputs (number of contact hours, number of staff per student, etc.) and achieving a certain performance and qualitative output level (actual attendance, full course work completed, etc.). The content of educational programmes was centrally approved and maintained through the quality of staff training, sufficient number of contact hours and quality control of educational materials. Academic freedom can not be viewed as a core concept in Soviet higher education. The control of the standard of outcomes (actual knowledge and the skills acquired by the students) was less of a concern to the centrally-planned authority. There was also an internal conflict of interest built into the final outcome control as it was primarily completed and organised internally by staff who provided educational services (the universities themselves). However, this type of administrative system was in a position to secure a sufficient level of quality and most public Universities had a reputation as 'respectable' organisations. This traditional public attitude of good quality education provided by public institutions continues to dominate the public's perceptions of the provision of education.
A college degree provided significant status for any graduate. In the 1970s a higher education degree was an important promotional requirement in many industries and government entities.
However, there were some significant distortions in the labour market that generated noticeable monetary disincentives for a better education system, in particular at the low and middle management positions in the industry and in the public provision of social services (health and compulsory education). The demand for higher education was always noticeable in Soviet society. However there did come a point in the early 80s when the willingness of students to enter engineering programmes started to decline. This was offset in various ways, very often through various market type instruments, for example additional stipends for students which could be up to two or three times higher in engineering programmes than in the humanities.
The university as an institution and a legal entity
The traditional Soviet command administrative economy treated universities as if they were regular state-owned enterprises. University rectors would be appointed by the Federal Ministry and have reporting responsibilities on many operational issues to the Ministry staff.
The itemised budget of the university was defined by the same Ministry. The content of education (curricula) would also be approved by the Ministry as was the number of students to be enrolled. Student enrolments were also itemised by speciality (major) at the discretion of the Ministry and co-ordinated with the State Planning Committee (Gosplan). Creation of a new chair or department within a college would also require consultation with and approval from the Ministry.
In the early 1980s a major decentralisation effort was undertaken to respond to the growing inefficiency caused by the increasing administrative rigidities in the higher education system. The idea of university autonomy was initiated, with leading university academics being invited to participate in defining the content of education through a system of councils set up to examine particular subject areas. The most significant breakthrough was achieved when a decision was taken that every university should be governed according to its own charter.
However the principal guidelines of these charters continued to be designed and formulated by the Ministry. One of the main changes was that university rectors were to be elected by university academic councils or senates and would no longer be directly appointed by the Ministry.
The gradual decentralisation of public higher education institutions were codified by the Russian Law on Education passed in 1992, which was amended and extended in 1996.
According to this legislation educational services were to be provided by 'educational uchrezdenija' (educational entities). These types of institutions were akin to those inherited from the Soviet tradition of law and governmental administration. This legal form is also currently applied to hospitals, museums, research institutes and educational institutions of public, municipal and non-governmental ownership.
The current Civil Code defines 'uchrezdenije' as one of the types of not-for-profit institutions which should not have profit generation as its primary purpose. Therefore it does not distribute profit to its founders even though still being financed by the founder, fully or partially, and should only be involved in entrepreneurial activity that is not contradictory to its main mission. These 'educational uchrezdenija' are permitted to undertake entrepreneurial activity without limitation. The revenues from these activities can also be invested into areas not directly related to the educational missions of the 'uchrezdenije'. Governmental 'educational uchrezdenija' are also autonomous by law. They are free to set up their own internal organisation, to hire and fire staff and pursue various types of activities (including entrepreneurial activities). They are permitted to define the uses of their revenues, to rent and lease assets, set up other legal entities and organise contractual relationships with other entities. The 1996 'Law of Higher and Professional Education' stipulates that the relationship between the founder (the State) and the IHE should be specified by a periodically reviewed contract. The implementation of these contracts is as yet undeveloped, but ideally these contracts can define the level and time of funding to be provided to the IHE by the founder (the State and/or the Ministry). Moreover the founder may define some contractual obligations for IHEs to contribute in part to its revenue from the founder's budget. 4 Current Russian legislation defines the tangible assets used by IHEs under three broad headings. Firstly, the assets contributed by the founder to the IHE. Secondly, the assets developed in the course of the IHE performing their specified tasks or those donated to the IHE, and thirdly land. The assets contributed by the founder are passed to the IHE for operational use. This means that these assets can be used for mission (Education) purposes, but if used inefficiently or left idle they can be withdrawn by the founder. According to law, IHEs are permitted to lease assets of this type but their sale without the explicit permission of the founder is prohibited. The assets developed by IHEs are under full control of the IHE and can be lent or sold at the discretion of the institution. Land is given to IHEs free, without restriction as to use, and IHEs are permitted to lease part of this land to other end users. They cannot however sell their land under current legislation.
The aforementioned developments clearly show that the legal and institutional framework for Russian IHEs has changed dramatically in the last decade. While at the end of the 1980s, every aspect of a university's performance was under the explicit control of federal agencies, currently very large areas of university activity are the full responsibility of the university itself. This has major implications for the development of new governance schemes, including identification of core principles and developing a set of comprehensive regulations (this may be interpreted as the specification of internal property rights and the definition of an appropriate contractual framework).
Under the Soviet system the governance framework required a single set of regulations and normative acts (set of contracts) that applied to all and every university in the country. This produced uniformity and clarity and therefore reduced internal transaction costs in the management of universities. The new decentralised system requires that every autonomous university should undertake specific efforts to define its own governance principles, most appropriate management structure and set up procedures and rules to match the needs of the university. This task can only be successfully accomplished within the framework of a relatively stable legal, economic and institutional environment. This would allow the university to identify its strategic mission and fully understand the methods needed for the successful achievement of it. There are only a few Russian universities that are currently in a position to achieve this. Firstly, universities are short of capable managers to perform the appropriate tasks and secondly, they lack capacity for a professional analysis of the practical and conceptual issues of educational governance. Moreover the external environment continues to be one of extreme uncertainty for many universities.
The organisation of the faculty -institutional aspects
Academic staff of Russian Universities are assigned to organisational units that are called 'kafedra' (chair) to provide teaching in certain disciplines. The head of the chair is expected to be a leading academic in the respective discipline and a significant authority in matters of education. The hiring and promotion of academic and other staff as well as curriculum developments are the responsibility of the chair. The position of chair brings significant prestige and is a major aid in the further academic promotion of a faculty member.
Traditionally heads of chairs keep their positions for long periods as there is no time limit for individuals to keep the post. The Russian head of chair comes historically from the German 'Lehrstuhlleiter' and is institutionally very different from the Anglo-Saxon academic Head of Department. Chairs are more important elements of institutional governance in large researchoriented Russian universities as compared to smaller institutions of higher education, where it is the colleges ('faculteti' ) that play a more significant role.
The faculty staff of Russian higher education institutions have three formal attributes. The first one is related to research advancement, and the measurement of this is a degree of Candidate or Doctor of Science in the specific field of research. Degrees are awarded by special expert councils on a basis of theses provided by the applicant. It is interesting to note that although the Expert Councils are designed to assess research outcomes, it is mandatory that they are chaired by a faculty member having an administrative position at least at a college level. Theses are considered according to fairly detailed and rigid universal procedures including pier reviewers. Final approval for a degree comes from the federal level central authority the 'Higher Accreditation Committee'.
The second characteristic reflects the position that academic staff have within the College.
The possible positions are 'assistant', 'senior lecturer', 'associate professor' ('dozent' in the German educational system) and 'professor'. Promotion depends on the research quality of the candidate, length of teaching experience, availability of positions in the staff plan of the chair or college as well as the overall payroll constraint. After one year of service in the positions of associate professor or professor, staff could be considered for the award of corresponding academic degrees by the Higher Accreditation Committee subject to the initiation of the award by the Academic Council of the college or university concerned. Every faculty member has to be re-elected to his position every three to five years, no matter how long he has been in service. Therefore tenure does not exist from a legal point of view, but de facto it does. Cases of senior (associate) professors not re-elected for another term is practically unheard of.
New academic staff in the leading Russian universities are usually hired from the graduates of postgraduate programmes within each university. The available vacancies for junior staff are generally allocated to the best performing graduates from PhD. programmes who make a contribution to the theoretical or practical development that prevails within the specific 'kafedra'. As far as vacancies for senior staff are concerned, they are also often filled by a candidate from within the college. These vacancies are advertised and the positions filled by a selection process. However, the overall procedure is explicitly hostile to external applicants.
Information about available positions is rather restricted for outsiders, since the mid-1980s obligatory public advertisements have been introduced but are usually limited to outlets within the internal university circulation. Moreover, advertisements are only published after the administration has sought an internal candidate and in many cases after an internal decision has already been made on his/her promotion. Participation in administrative management generally leads to more rapid academic promotion and this is often considered as a sign of the appreciation of such work. The most important body for decision-making on these personnel matters in Russian Higher Education is the Academic Council of the colleges and universities. These also represent the only groups in which long-term policies, annual budgets, major curriculum change and the restructuring of universities can be collegially discussed. Therefore the composition and staffing of these academic councils are of major importance for understanding the incentive structure behind their decisions.
As defined by recently introduced charters for many Russian universities and the Guidelines for the Statute of Institutes of Higher Education, the University Academic Council includes 5 The lack of a developed real estate market and the high costs involved in moving from one city to another as well as the administrative regulation in entry to some of the major cities placed additional constraints on the possibilities of academic mobility and cross-fertilisation of various institutions, that could strengthen the professional disciplines.
all the deans of colleges and leading academic staff. Correspondingly, the Academic Councils at the college level include all the heads of chairs as well as some other academic staff. It is important to note that the Rector of the university and Dean of the college chair the academic councils of the universities and colleges ex officio. This means that university/college senior executive staff control the agenda for council meetings (known as the 'agenda-setting' function) and dominate decision making. Also the council membership is fairly homogenous and dominated by the strategic views of university/college administrators. These councils, to a significant degree, are controlled by the rectors (deans) and are traditionally oriented towards maintaining the status quo. This inward-oriented membership structure of the councils leads to a situation where little emphasis is placed on academic organisational and financial innovation for higher education.
The Internal Organisation of Russian Universities: Monitoring and Incentive Mechanisms
The centralised administrative governance and management of Soviet higher education emphasised clear definition of rules and procedures, fairly detailed monitoring through comprehensive reporting while placing a secondary role on providing incentives for performance. Revision of core principles of university performance and management under transition required a redefinition of the role of monitoring and providing incentives in particular. Incentives are becoming an important part of overall management, budgeting and allocation of funds and are crucial to the success of the university as an organisation.
The governance system and internal rigidities of public funding
The administrative governance system performed fairly well within a stable environment and when there was little need for innovation and change. However, the current environment requires much strategic development, flexibility and new incentives for University staff.
Implementation of new management alternatives is often delayed and this adversely affects the necessary restructuring of academic programmes.
The hierarchical governance system continues to influence the allocation of public funding both to and within Russian educational institutions. Public funding allocated to universities from federal ministries is initially calculated on the basis of a formula where the overall number of students is the key numeraire. Although the actual amount allocated to the university is subject to political and bargaining distortions during the budgeting process, the core scheme based on a formula is an important starting point for budgeting. This is in stark contrast to the internal allocation of funding within universities which is based on completely different principles. It is the relative number of currently employed payroll staff (both academic and non-academic) within each college that defines the percentage of public funding allocated to each college. The number of students attending various courses, shifts in student demand and performance indicators do not directly effect the allocation of current public funding across parts of the university. As a result, a strong disincentive to reduce the number of staff employed in any given area is emerging. Introduction of more efficient teaching techniques is considered counterproductive as it may lead to large reductions in staff and consequently a reduction in the budget available to the chair or college in general. It also makes any structural changes politically difficult as every part of the university is highly motivated to keep as many staff in place as possible.
This combination of hierarchical governance mechanisms dominated by insiders and the mechanism for internal allocation of public funds within universities results in delayed restructuring of universities and their academic programmes. The lack of transmission of the external changes through the governance system (existing academic councils) and the strong disincentives for change, blocked many necessary innovations within core programmes of the public universities. Although there is strong pressure from the changing student demand (increased numbers of students who major in social sciences, foreign languages and computer science), there is no evidence of a reduction in the number of colleges or chairs specialising in teaching disciplines with low demand (specialised engineering, etc.). There is also scant evidence of a reduction in the number of publicly-funded staff teaching in those disciplines with low demand and an increase in publicly-funded staff in those disciplines with high demand.
The differentiation in the pay from public sources to staff members continues to have no direct link to performance. Teaching large or small classes and/or having a limited work load because of low demand or a large work load because of high demand rarely affects staff pay.
The publicly-funded salary of academic staff continues to be defined on the basis of seniority, academic degree and the number of years service, while actual performance record has a secondary role in defining the amount of pay. This might not be so problematic if it was clear that performance indicators were more relevant for promotion, but this is not certain either.
Faculty evaluation by students, introduced in late 1980s on the wave of democratisation and as an instrument of feedback, was gradually eliminated and is non-existent in the majority of universities. Evaluations are used only in the emerging programmes of business education.
Disintegration of the traditional monitoring mechanism
The internal integrity of an organisation depends on two main features; first, a clear definition of its mission and second, internal organisation and a set of governance principles that match the mission of the organisation to secure its efficient performance. A balanced and sustainable governance scheme requires appropriate incentives in place to secure sufficient levels of commitment by staff, and an appropriate organisation to monitor and police the fulfilment of contractual arrangements in order to provide efficient contract enforcement. Neglect of monitoring and policing costs result in aggravation of the principal-agent problem, while development of a purely self-enforceable environment based on individual incentives may result either in the disintegration of the firm or decline in the quality of output, e.g. the mission is not fulfilled. 6 Typically, Soviet universities were fairly comprehensive organisations with rather sophisticated mechanisms of quality and performance controls based on administrative principles of management. As is the case in every administrative hierarchical system there were many flaws in the inherited structure. It was the status and the compliance to rules that were primarily remunerated rather than innovation or efficiency. However, it is important to note that a strictly regulated system of academic promotions supported the development of reputation and in conjunction with strict internal academic control contributed to maintaining the quality of teaching input in many of the Soviet universities.
Until the end of the 1970s, the basic salary in higher education provided a reasonable standard of living for middle level academic positions. There was a fairly comprehensive system of non-salary (in kind) incentives available for university management to be used as a stimulus for the appropriate performance of staff. These included the provision of subsidised housing and other durable goods. Overheads linked to extra-budgetary research funding had more flexibility in their allocation and could also be used by the university and college management as an important cash incentive for performance.
The financial base for many of these incentive mechanisms has evaporated in recent years during the economic transformation. High inflation during the first years of reform led to the erosion of the purchasing power of the publicly-funded university salary. The real value of the monetary salary has depreciated dramatically. By the end of 1996 it was equal to 30-40 per cent of the pre-reform level (depending on the region). After 1994 many universities suffered from monthly delays in public financing which was the primary cause of delay in the payment of salaries to staff. Extra-budgetary research funding has also dried up because of the severe economic decline in industry and the resulting lack of funding for R&D. Moreover the universities have almost lost the ability to provide their staff with subsidised housing and other durable goods.
These dramatic developments could be interpreted as a violation of the (implicit) contract between academic staff and the university, and in a more stable contractual environment would result in a multitude of lawsuits from trade unions and academics against the university administration. This has not been the case in Russia, where contracts between the university rectors and the university board have as yet to be put into practice. Also, formal employment contracts between staff and the university were only introduced in 1995, under which the clauses related to non-payment of salaries have yet to be covered properly. The authors are unaware of a single legal case in the country related to such contracts.
It is natural to assume that, under these circumstances, there would be a significant increase in non-cooperation such as cheating and shirking by academic staff. This may have a negative effect on the quality of teaching that would only become evident in the medium to long term.
The financial shock has triggered a disintegration of the traditional administrative mechanisms for the monitoring and performance of staff. At the same time the self-enforcing mechanisms of quality control based on tuition payments, which could provide a strong motivational force to secure the quality of teaching are as yet not in place within the publicly funded programmes of Russian universities. In theory this disintegration of the traditional monitoring and incentive mechanisms should inevitably lead to a gradual deterioration in the quality of publicly funded educational services. Currently we do not have any clear documented evidence to support this hypothesis.
The Evolving Mission of the Russian University and the Organisation of New Areas of Activity
The traditional mission of the Russian (Soviet) University had been to serve the educational and research needs of the state and of society. More specifically, missions and priorities as well as the allocation of resources were defined by the central government and rarely took into account potential specific needs and wishes of the individual. Rapid political, social and economic transformation of the country has resulted in an undermining of these traditional priorities. This had significant implications for the content of education, transformation of which could not be administered overnight. It is important to note that during the transition period the medium to long-term priorities for higher education have remained undefined. The nature of the future Russian society and the state is unclear at the moment, nor can we expect the future comparative advantage of the economy and long-term labour markets to be clearly defined. Therefore the current situation is one of major uncertainty, and a feeling of lost direction is inevitable for the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, in the longer term, the major new priorities of Russian higher education are clearer. Under a democratic and market-driven society new Russian universities should be able to serve the interests of the individual, regional community and society as a whole and ultimately fulfil the needs and requirements of the nation as it develops through the transition process. The sequencing of priorities does not reflect their relative importance. Many of these priorities are not fully comprehended by many Russian educationalists or policy-makers.
However there is a growing and emerging movement amongst the leaders of IHEs and senior policy-makers to formulate priorities along the following lines:
a)
The new mission of the public university c)
The new mission of Russian universities and the internal profit centre concept
As previously explained, one of the responses of IHEs in the UK to the legislative reforms was the financial decentralisation to 'cost or profit' centres. Typically these operated at the departmental or faculty level. Internal profit centres are an attempt at the dissemination of internal governance arrangements to more decentralised, semiautonomous units. The arrangements and responsibilities of these centres would oversee the financial practices with respect to their teaching and research functions. Essentially this mirrored the workings of an internal market in the allocation of resources across the institution, subject to some safety net provided by the institution. The adaptation of such internal organisation structures is therefore an important aspect of the evolving organisation of Russian universities.
The traditional organisation of universities in Russia did not include the concept of an internal profit centre. It was usually the institution as a whole that was considered as the 'profit' centre. 7 With the development of increased autonomy for IHEs and the severe financial stringency, universities and their various sub-divisions were faced with the necessity of earning revenues and the issue of the location of the profit centres within institutions quickly became crucial both in terms of efficiency and political economy.
The location of the profit centres within a given IHE is dependent on two considerations. Firstly, the size of the IHE and secondly, the level of integration of revenue-generating functions within the IHE. In some cases within the largest universities the chairs became the profit centres along with faculties (colleges). In the medium size IHEs it was usually a function of the number of faculties and in the smaller
IHEs it was the university itself that performed in this capacity. The second consideration is of the level of integration of the new revenue generating functions into the core mission of the University. The more innovative the university is in generating revenue the higher the location of profit centre in the internal structure of the University. It should be stressed here that all these developments in Russian higher 7 The word 'profit' centre is used here in relation to Soviet colleges and universities in order not to confuse the reader by introducing different concepts. It should be remembered that the concept of profit was definitely not applicable to any state-owned institution of the social sector, and colleges and universities were more 'revenue accounting points'. There is substantial anecdotal evidence that entrepreneurial activities which universities, as a public 'uchrezdenie', are permitted to be involved in are actually performed by semi-private entities founded by universities. The basis for these cases is that the operating environment is often based on vague contractual relationships, poor monitoring by principals and conflicts of interest caused by low basic wages for university staff. Operation of semi-private firms on university premises often leads to loss of revenue by the university (as a firm) and appropriation (dissipation) of this revenue by private companies. This is caused by the under-pricing of the goods and services provided and can be easily interpreted within the standard framework of rentseeking behaviour.
Many large universities are now surrounded by a number of small firms, foundations and associations that act as intermediaries between various customers of non-traditional academic services and the university as the actual provider of these services. Many of the contracts between the intermediaries and university are of an informal nature and often include clauses relating to non-monetary compensation, which in itself is inefficient.
The university as a firm: Transformation of Russian University hierarchy in the light of transaction cost approach
The transaction cost approach of analysing firms was introduced by Coase and applied by
Williamson in examining hierarchies and the internal structure of firms. Transaction costs can be defined as the costs involved in the operation of an economic system, especially those associated with the identification of partners and the carrying out of transactions between economic agents. The application to institutions and firms seems obvious. However the neoclassical mode of analysis, viewing of the firm as a set of production relationships and with transactions costs assumed (tacitly) to be zero, has continued to preoccupy most writers.
Transactions costs involve those costs associated with planning, ownership, monitoring, contracting and negotiation within different organisational structures. This also includes other costs deriving from the existence of information asymmetries among agents. These types of cost are generally brought about by the divergent interests between agents within the organisation.
Universities can also be treated as a firm and estimates of the amount and type of transaction costs can help to explain the size of the university, its specialisation and product line mix.
Universities are characterised by different types of exchanges that occur between separate departments, research branches and service units. These include both explicit exchanges (e.g.
science department contributing to delivery of programmes administered by humanities colleges) and exchanges with implicit positive externalities (e.g. improved quality of teaching because faculties are involved in research and present modern developments within classes).
These exchanges could be organised between completely independent entities on purely market principles. However, it may happen that the costs of running these exchanges through an open market would be higher than the costs of administrating these exchanges within the internal system of a university. This is an economic justification for the existence of a university as an organisation, rather than a set of independent companies teaching separate courses and providing certain services. This methodology can be applied to the assessment of recent developments in the Russian University sector.
Although formal markets did not exist in the command administrative economy, the transaction cost approach can provide a possible explanation for the growing size of the universities in the Soviet era and for the composition of services they provided. The diversification of Soviet universities developed in a unique and specific way. Although Soviet universities had limited involvement in fundamental research, which was organised in specialised research institutes under the Russian Academy of Sciences, universities undertook applied research on a contractual basis for the various industrial enterprises. All the major universities were also involved in a number of supporting or ancillary activities. These Very few of these services were contracted out to independent suppliers. Most of them were directly provided by units of universities that were specifically established for those purposes.
This was done because of the poor development of the service sector in the Soviet economy, and the high transaction costs involved in their purchase from external providers under the command administrative economy. The 'market' contracting for these services would be at a high cost of co-ordination as it would require the allocation of planned resources well in advance by the central planning authorities. It would also involve numerous management decisions at the higher levels of planning authorities in municipal housing, catering, transportation, and other industries. The enforcement of such 'bureaucratic market' contracts would also pose a major problem which would provide strong incentives for the internalisation by universities of all these lines of 'business' that were not directly related to education or research. It is clear that the diversification of universities into these types of activities led to an undermining of the advantages from specialisation which resulted in a loss of economic efficiency. It is also clear that it was caused by the high transaction costs of doing business in the environment of a command administrative economy.
The market economic reforms resulted in the rapid development of the service sector in the Russian economy, 8 and the availability of the independent provision of services from outwith the university sector. During transition many subsidies were eliminated, costs of many services were monetized and under tight budget constraints for the universities, the IHEs were forced to review their industrial structure. This, in effect, made it impossible to continue provision of non-educational services in the traditional way.
In some extreme cases the universities would completely withdraw from providing certain services. The prevailing option in housing is one of divestiture, where university housing is passed onto the municipality for management and maintenance. In most other cases the universities leased space and equipment to newly established private service providers, with specified contractual relationships. As far as student dormitories are concerned, universities have had to eliminate this service or shut down many dormitories and lease the space to private businesses not related to the education process. Alternative provision of student housing services from the private sector has yet to fully develop in such a short period of time, and currently non-resident students face very high prices for their housing or a physical shortage of space for residences. In addition, with the high cost of living in university cities, the current (1993-97) outcome is one where many universities face a significant decline in enrolments from non-resident students. Therefore the trend is that universities are becoming more specialised in providing education as they tend to reduce their involvement in auxiliary lines of business or try to contract them out. This is a positive development as an increase in specialisation and concentration of budget resources on the core lines of business is essential for reducing costs.
Institutional Change and Restructuring of Russian Universities: Economic Efficiency Considerations
The continuing diversity of institutional and financial developments within Russian universities can be summarised by two opposite extremes. The first may be represented by a university that continues to remain under the control of the traditional educational and administrative authorities. It has limited transparency and limited substitution of the publicly allocated budget to market generated funding. The traditional bureaucratic and hierarchical governance structure of these universities makes the internal costs of arranging contracts for innovative activities rather high. Under these circumstances interaction of the new market demand and the rigidity of the administrative hierarchy results in a broad spread of semiprivate commercialised entities outwith the core line of university business. This is also associated with visible rent-seeking amongst the management of these universities. There is evidence of disintegration trends within the management structure and new uses of the assets of the university. These are generally organised primarily through semi-private university units. It could be said that these universities are evolving along the lines of a 'survival strategy' for their institutions, which is a reflection of the opportunistic behaviour of the university management elite.
The other extreme is a model of a reformed university which is more integrated and includes new functions in the core mission of the university. This involves a consistent innovative strategy for the institutions, under which financial planning and financial management are more developed. The governance structure of these universities is usually more open to the external stakeholders and reflects the ability of the university to overcome internal opposition to innovative restructuring initiatives. Universities of these types can be considered as taking an innovative strategy, which is a reflection of the strategic behaviour on the part of management. Although the short-term costs of transition in these situations are often more significant for staff members, the medium to long-term benefits for the organisation and for the staff of the reformed University are clearly much higher.
Despite the financial crisis in Russian higher education we would tend to conclude that the efficiency of Russian Higher education has improved in the last decade. This was a result of the real decline in public funding that previously in the pre-reform period had been used in an inefficient manner. Also there has been a significant increase in the supply of privately purchased educational services that currently fills the clear structural gap in education.
Moreover there has been an increase in the non-educational use of capital stock by IHEs, which would otherwise have remained idle. This has been concurrent with an increase in the external activities of faculty staff.
The sector continues to be plagued by inherent inefficiencies both in terms of allocative and internal (technical) inefficiency. 9 Future improvements will depend on several critical factors.
There needs to be progress in the exogenous macroeconomic environment in order to breed institutional and fiscal stability. As far as endogenous developments are concerned, it is critically important that the federal regulatory bodies eliminate the rigid separation of public and 'extra-budgetary' financial flows that cause internal disintegration within the universities.
The mandatory itemised disbursement of public funds for universities should be eliminated, and public funds should be allocated to universities as block grants calculated on the basis of per capita formulas. Finally, disclosure of all financial inflows and expenditures of universities should become obligatory and institutions should be carefully screened with regard to the establishment of separate legal entities and various subsidiaries.
These core steps can only help to promote the transparency of financial flows to Russian higher education to aid the stakeholders in identifying their rights with respect to the process of resource allocation. Their explicit involvement in the education process will become the main driving force for financial and governance innovation. It is this factor that will ultimately achieve the structural adjustment that is necessary in Russian higher education.
Conclusions
Russian Higher education is in the process of significant adjustment at the most basic level of the university and within the primary structure of the university. Significant academic and managerial autonomy has been given to the university as part of this adjustment process.
However, in order to secure stability and efficiency within the new decentralised system of Higher Education there must be further systemic changes. This would ensure an increase in the related investments required within the higher education sector.
Initially, it is crucial to develop an appropriate scheme for IHEs in terms of governance and financial management. Subsequently there must be trained professional managers in universities along the lines of a newly decentralised, efficient and stable institution. Thirdly, some of the existing guidelines for university governance principles need to be amended in order to increase client responsiveness from the universities. Finally, important changes in the financial procedures need to be introduced and implemented. This involves the provision of public funding to the university in the form of a block grant and the consolidation of budget and extra-budgetary accounting. It is these factors that will ultimately facilitate the integration of the universities into the new economic system.
